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Merge pull request #2524 from uhoreg/e2e_misc_fixes_202005

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misc fixes in e2ee spec
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Hubert Chathi 2020-05-05 16:10:27 -04:00 • committed by GitHub
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3 changed files with 10 additions and 9 deletions
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2
api/client-server/keys.yaml
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@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ paths:
responses:
200:
description:
The provided keys were sucessfully uploaded.
The provided keys were successfully uploaded.
schema:
type: object
properties:

1
changelogs/client_server/newsfragments/2524.clarification Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1 @@
Fix various spelling errors throughout the specification.

16
specification/modules/end_to_end_encryption.rst
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@ -565,9 +565,9 @@ The process between Alice and Bob verifying each other would be:
they match or not.
#. Assuming they match, Alice and Bob's devices calculate the HMAC of their own device keys
and a comma-separated sorted list of of the key IDs that they wish the other user
to verify, using SHA-256 as the hash function. HMAC is defined in [RFC 2104](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104).
to verify, using SHA-256 as the hash function. HMAC is defined in `RFC 2104 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104>`_.
The key for the HMAC is different for each item and is calculated by generating
32 bytes (256 bits) using `the key verification HKDF <#SAS-HKDF>`_.
32 bytes (256 bits) using `the key verification HKDF <#sas-hkdf>`_.
#. Alice's device sends Bob's device a ``m.key.verification.mac`` message containing the
MAC of Alice's device keys and the MAC of her key IDs to be verified. Bob's device does
the same for Bob's device keys and key IDs concurrently with Alice.
@ -653,14 +653,14 @@ are used in addition to those already specified:
{{m_key_verification_mac_event}}
.. _`SAS-HKDF`:
.. _sas-hkdf:
HKDF calculation
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
In all of the SAS methods, HKDF is as defined in [RFC 5869](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869)
In all of the SAS methods, HKDF is as defined in `RFC 5869 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869>`_
and uses the previously agreed-upon hash function for the hash function. The shared
secret is supplied as the input keying material. No salt is used, and the input
secret is supplied as the input keying material. No salt is used, and the info
parameter is the concatenation of:
* The string ``MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_SAS``.
@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ parameter is the concatenation of:
For verification of each party's device keys, HKDF is as defined in RFC 5869 and
uses SHA-256 as the hash function. The shared secret is supplied as the input keying
material. No salt is used, and in the input parameter is the concatenation of:
material. No salt is used, and in the info parameter is the concatenation of:
* The string ``MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_MAC``.
* The Matrix ID of the user whose key is being MAC-ed.
@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ material. No salt is used, and in the input parameter is the concatenation of:
SAS method: ``decimal``
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
Generate 5 bytes using `HKDF <#SAS-HKDF>`_ then take sequences of 13 bits to
Generate 5 bytes using `HKDF <#sas-hkdf>`_ then take sequences of 13 bits to
convert to decimal numbers (resulting in 3 numbers between 0 and 8191 inclusive
each). Add 1000 to each calculated number.
@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ such as dashes, or with the numbers on individual lines.
SAS method: ``emoji``
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
Generate 6 bytes using `HKDF <#SAS-HKDF>`_ then split the first 42 bits into
Generate 6 bytes using `HKDF <#sas-hkdf>`_ then split the first 42 bits into
7 groups of 6 bits, similar to how one would base64 encode something. Convert
each group of 6 bits to a number and use the following table to get the corresponding
emoji: