From 3877896a4cb232ce760f1556d7a1fc6de001b95f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Travis Ralston Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2019 08:10:52 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] Clarify how we now expect verification to be done --- .../modules/end_to_end_encryption.rst | 18 ++++-------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/specification/modules/end_to_end_encryption.rst b/specification/modules/end_to_end_encryption.rst index fb3d2ba5..fb320dc4 100644 --- a/specification/modules/end_to_end_encryption.rst +++ b/specification/modules/end_to_end_encryption.rst @@ -384,20 +384,10 @@ man-in-the-middle. This verification process requires an out-of-band channel: there is no way to do it within Matrix without trusting the administrators of the homeservers. -In Matrix, the basic process for device verification is for Alice to verify -that the public Ed25519 signing key she received via ``/keys/query`` for Bob's -device corresponds to the private key in use by Bob's device. For now, it is -recommended that clients provide mechanisms by which the user can see: - -1. The public part of their device's Ed25519 signing key, encoded using - `unpadded Base64`_. - -2. The list of devices in use for each user in a room, along with the public - Ed25519 signing key for each device, again encoded using unpadded Base64. - -Alice can then meet Bob in person, or contact him via some other trusted -medium, and use `SAS Verification`_ or ask him to read out the Ed25519 key -shown on his device, comparing it to the one shown on Alice's device. +In Matrix, verification works by Alice meeting Bob in person, or contact him +via some other trusted medium, and use `SAS Verification`_ to interactively +verify Bob's devices. Alice and Bob may also read aloud their unpadded base64 +encoded Ed25519 public key, as returned by ``/keys/query``. Device verification may reach one of several conclusions. For example: