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sas: clarify ECDH process in step 12 (#1720)

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Co-authored-by: Denis Kasak <dkasak@termina.org.uk>
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Sumner Evans 2024-02-26 09:26:34 -07:00 • committed by GitHub
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10
content/client-server-api/modules/end_to_end_encryption.md
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@ -660,10 +660,12 @@ The process between Alice and Bob verifying each other would be:
11. Alice's device receives Bob's message and verifies the commitment
hash from earlier matches the hash of the key Bob's device just sent
and the content of Alice's `m.key.verification.start` message.
12. Both Alice and Bob's devices perform an Elliptic-curve
Diffie-Hellman
(*ECDH(K<sub>A</sub><sup>private</sup>*, *K<sub>B</sub><sup>public</sup>*)),
using the result as the shared secret.
12. Both Alice's and Bob's devices perform an Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman using
their private ephemeral key, and the other device's ephemeral public key
(*ECDH(K<sub>A</sub><sup>private</sup>*, *K<sub>B</sub><sup>public</sup>*)
for Alice's device and
*ECDH(K<sub>B</sub><sup>private</sup>*, *K<sub>A</sub><sup>public</sup>*)
for Bob's device), using the result as the shared secret.
13. Both Alice and Bob's devices display a SAS to their users, which is
derived from the shared key using one of the methods in this
section. If multiple SAS methods are available, clients should allow