Merge pull request #1838 from aaronraimist/spell-check
Fix several spelling mistakes
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commit
b27bf59ae8
13 changed files with 19 additions and 19 deletions
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@ -52,6 +52,6 @@ Examples of strings encoded using unpadded Base64::
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UNPADDED_BASE64("foobar") = "Zm9vYmFy"
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When decoding Base64, implementations SHOULD accept input with or without
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padding characters whereever possible, to ensure maximum interoperability.
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padding characters wherever possible, to ensure maximum interoperability.
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.. _`RFC 4648`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4648
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@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ a homeserver creating a user ID for a new user based on the username passed to
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Implementations are free to do this mapping however they choose. Since the user
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ID is opaque except to the implementation which created it, the only
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requirement is that the implemention can perform the mapping
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requirement is that the implementation can perform the mapping
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consistently. However, we suggest the following algorithm:
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1. Encode character strings as UTF-8.
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@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ Other error codes the client might encounter are:
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Sent when the room alias given to the ``createRoom`` API is already in use.
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:``M_INVALID_ROOM_STATE``:
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Sent when the intial state given to the ``createRoom`` API is invalid.
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Sent when the initial state given to the ``createRoom`` API is invalid.
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:``M_THREEPID_IN_USE``:
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Sent when a threepid given to an API cannot be used because the same threepid is already in use.
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@ -636,7 +636,7 @@ To use this authentication type, clients should submit an auth dict as follows:
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where the ``identifier`` property is a user identifier object, as described in
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`Identifier types`_.
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For example, to authenticate using the user's Matrix ID, clients whould submit:
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For example, to authenticate using the user's Matrix ID, clients would submit:
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.. code:: json
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@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ Third-party ID
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:Type:
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``m.id.thirdparty``
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:Description:
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The user is identified by a third-party identifer in canonicalised form.
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The user is identified by a third-party identifier in canonicalised form.
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A client can identify a user using a 3pid associated with the user's account on
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the homeserver, where the 3pid was previously associated using the
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@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ Room versions are divided into two distinct groups: stable and unstable. Stable
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room versions may be used by rooms safely. Unstable room versions are everything
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else which is either not listed in the specification or flagged as unstable for
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some other reason. Versions can switch between stable and unstable periodically
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for a variety of reasons, including discovered security vulnerabilites and age.
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for a variety of reasons, including discovered security vulnerabilities and age.
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Clients should not ask room administrators to upgrade their rooms if the room is
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running a stable version. Servers SHOULD use room version 1 as the default room
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@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ The account_data may be either global or scoped to a particular rooms.
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Events
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------
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The client recieves the account data as events in the ``account_data`` sections
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The client receives the account data as events in the ``account_data`` sections
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of a ``/sync``.
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These events can also be received in a ``/events`` response or in the
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@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ previously-received ``request`` message with the same ``request_id`` and
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.. NOTE::
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Key sharing can be a big attack vector, thus it must be done very carefully.
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A reasonable stategy is for a user's client to only send keys requested by the
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A reasonable strategy is for a user's client to only send keys requested by the
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verified devices of the same user.
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Key exports
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@ -696,7 +696,7 @@ An event encrypted using Megolm has the following format:
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"sender_key": "<sender_curve25519_key>",
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"device_id": "<sender_device_id>",
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"session_id": "<outbound_group_session_id>",
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"ciphertext": "<encypted_payload_base_64>"
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"ciphertext": "<encrypted_payload_base_64>"
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}
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}
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@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ In addition to using the appropriate ``matrix.to URI`` for the mention,
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clients should use the following guidelines when making mentions in events
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to be sent:
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* When mentioning users, use the user's potentially ambigious display name for
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* When mentioning users, use the user's potentially ambiguous display name for
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the anchor's text. If the user does not have a display name, use the user's
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ID.
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@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ The tag namespace is defined as follows:
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* The namespace ``u.*`` is reserved for user-defined tags. The portion of the string after the ``u.``
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is defined to be the display name of this tag. No other semantics should be inferred from tags in
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this namespace.
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* A client or app willing to use special tags for advanced functionnality should namespace them similarly to state keys: ``tld.name.*``
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* A client or app willing to use special tags for advanced functionality should namespace them similarly to state keys: ``tld.name.*``
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* Any tag in the ``tld.name.*`` form but not matching the namespace of the current client should be ignored
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* Any tag not matching the above rules should be interpreted as a user tag from the ``u.*`` namespace, as if
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the name had already had ``u.`` stripped from the start (ie. the name of the tag is used as the
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@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ verification must still be performed, so the attack surface here is minimized.
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Security considerations
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-----------------------
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There are a number of privary and trust implications to this module.
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There are a number of privacy and trust implications to this module.
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It is important for user privacy that leaking the mapping between a matrix user
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ID and a third party identifier is hard. In particular, being able to look up
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@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ This describes the format used by "HTTP" pushers to send notifications of
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events to Push Gateways. If the endpoint returns an HTTP error code, the
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homeserver SHOULD retry for a reasonable amount of time using exponential backoff.
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When pushing notifications for events, the hoemserver is expected to include all of
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When pushing notifications for events, the homeserver is expected to include all of
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the event-related fields in the ``/notify`` request. When the homeserver is performing
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a push where the ``format`` is ``"event_id_only"``, only the ``event_id``, ``room_id``,
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``counts``, and ``devices`` are required to be populated.
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@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ The rules are as follows:
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Some consequences of these rules:
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* Unless you are a member of the room, the only permitted operations (apart
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from the intial create/join) are: joining a public room; accepting or
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from the initial create/join) are: joining a public room; accepting or
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rejecting an invitation to a room.
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* To unban somebody, you must have power level greater than or equal to both
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@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ Mainline ordering
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of condition 1 below.
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The *mainline ordering based on* :math:`P` of a set of events is the
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ordering, from smallest to largest, using the following comparision relation
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ordering, from smallest to largest, using the following comparison relation
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on events: for events :math:`x` and :math:`y`, :math:`x<y` if
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1. the closest mainline event to :math:`x` appears *before* the closest
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@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ The process overall is as follows:
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the IP address, including the port if one was provided.
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* If ``<delegated_hostname>`` is not an IP literal, and ``<delegated_port>``
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is present, an IP address is disovered by looking up an AAAA or A
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is present, an IP address is discovered by looking up an AAAA or A
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record for ``<delegated_hostname>``. The resulting IP address is
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used, alongside the ``<delegated_port>``. Requests must be made with a
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``Host`` header of ``<delegated_hostname>:<delegated_port>``. The
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@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ including content hashes. It is calculated as follows.
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3. The event is converted into `Canonical JSON`_.
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4. A sha256 hash is calculed on the resulting JSON object.
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4. A sha256 hash is calculated on the resulting JSON object.
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Calculating the content hash for an event
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@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ Example code
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# Keys under "unsigned" can be modified by other servers.
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# They are useful for conveying information like the age of an
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# event that will change in transit.
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# Since they can be modifed we need to exclude them from the hash.
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# Since they can be modified we need to exclude them from the hash.
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event_object.pop("unsigned", None)
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# Signatures will depend on the current value of the "hashes" key.
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@ -1192,7 +1192,7 @@ Example code
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[[TODO(markjh): Since the ``hash`` object cannot be redacted a server
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shouldn't allow too many hashes to be listed, otherwise a server might embed
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illict data within the ``hash`` object.
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illicit data within the ``hash`` object.
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We might want to specify a maximum number of keys for the
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``hash`` and we might want to specify the maximum output size of a hash]]
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