update AS API to merge in feedback from the pull request
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@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ In the registration process, the AS provides:
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* Credentials to identify itself as an approved application service for that HS
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* Details of the namespaces of users and rooms the AS is acting on behalf of and
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"subscribing to"
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* Namespaces are defined as a list of regexps against which to match room aliases,
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room IDs, and user IDs.
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* There is overlap between selecting events via the csv2 Filter API and subscribing
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to events here - perhaps subscription involves passing a filter token into the
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registration API.
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* A URL base for receiving requests from the HS (as the AS is a server,
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implementers expect to receive data via inbound requests rather than
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long-poll outbound requests)
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@ -101,8 +106,13 @@ On HS handling events to unknown users:
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@.irc.freenode.Arathorn:matrix.org. This lets Matrix users communicate with
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foreign users who are not yet mapped into Matrix via 3PID mappings or through
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an existing non-virtual Matrix user by trying to talk to them via a gateway.
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* The AS can preprovision virtual users using the existing CS API rather than
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lazy-loading them in this manner.
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* The AS can alternatively preprovision virtual users using the existing CS API
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rather than lazy-loading them in this manner.
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* The AS may want to link the matrix ID of the sender through to their 3PID in
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the remote ecosystem. E.g. a message sent from @matthew:matrix.org may wish
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to originate from Arathorn on irc.freenode.net in the case of an IRC bridge.
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It's left as an AS implementation detail as to how the user should authorise
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the AS to act on its behalf.
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On HS handling events to unknown rooms:
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@ -116,12 +126,19 @@ On HS handling events to unknown rooms:
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from the point of m.room.create, we will not be able to back-populate
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arbitrary history for rooms which are lazy-created in this manner, and instead
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have to chose the amount of history to be synchronised into the AS as a one-off.
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* If exposing arbitrary history is required, then either the room history must be
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preemptively provisioned in the HS by the AS via the CS API (TODO: meaning the
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CS API needs to support massaged timestamps), or the HS must delegate conversation
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storage entirely to the AS using a Storage API (not defined here) which allows
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the existing conversation store to back the HS, complete with all necessary
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Matrix metadata (e.g. hashes, signatures, federation DAG, etc).
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* If exposing arbitrary history is required, then:
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* either: the room history must be preemptively provisioned in the HS by the AS via
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the CS API (TODO: meaning the CS API needs to support massaged
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timestamps), resulting in conversation history being replicated between
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the HS and the source store.
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* or: the HS must delegate conversation storage entirely to the
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AS using a Storage API (not defined here) which allows the existing
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conversation store to back the HS, complete with all necessary Matrix
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metadata (e.g. hashes, signatures, federation DAG, etc). This obviously
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increases the burden of implementing an AS considerably, but is the only
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option if the implementer wants to avoid duplicating conversation history
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between the external data source and the HS.
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On HS handling events to existing users and rooms:
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@ -130,7 +147,20 @@ On HS handling events to existing users and rooms:
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is handled as normal.
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* Events in the namespaces of rooms and users that the AS has subscribed to
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are pushed to the AS using the same pattern as the federation API (without
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any of the encryption or federation metadata). TODO: are they linearised?
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any of the encryption or federation metadata). This serves precisely the
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same purpose as the CS event stream and has the same data flow semantics
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(and indeed an AS implementer could chose to use the CS event stream instead)
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* Events are linearised to avoid the AS having to handle the complexity of
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linearisation, and because if linearisation is good enough for CS, it
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should be good enough for AS. Should the AS require non-linearised events
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from Matrix, it should implement the federation API rather than the AS API
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instead.
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* HS->AS event pushes are retried for reliability with sequence numbers
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(or logical timestamping?) to presereve the linearisation order and ensure
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a reliable event stream.
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* Clustered HSes must linearise just as they do for the CS API. Clustered
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ASes must loadbalance the inbound stream across the cluster as required.
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On AS relaying events from unknown-to-HS users:
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@ -146,6 +176,12 @@ On AS relaying events from unknown-to-HS users:
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* TODO: or do we maintain a separate access_token mapping? It seems like
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unnecessary overhead for the AS developer; easier to just use a single
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privileged access_token and just track which userid is emitting events?
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* If the AS is spoofing the identity of a real (not virtual) matrix user,
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we should actually let them log themselves in via OAuth2 to give permission
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to the AS to act on their behalf.
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* We can't auth gatewayed virtual users from 3rd party systems who are being
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relayed into Matrix, as the relaying is happening whether the user likes it
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or not. Therefore we do need to be able to spoof sender ID for virtual users.
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On AS relaying events in unknown-to-HS rooms:
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@ -180,11 +216,18 @@ AS Visibility:
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being physically seen in the room. In this scenario, the user should set
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its presence to 'invisible', a state that HSes should only allow AS-authed
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users to set.
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E2E Encryption
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* The AS obviously has no visibility to E2E encrypted messages, unless it is
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explicitly added to an encrypted room and participates in the group chat
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itself.
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Extensions to CS API
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====================
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* Ability to assert the identity of the virtual user for all methods.
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* Ability to massage timestamps when prepopulating historical state and
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messages of virtual rooms.
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messages of virtual rooms (either by overriding origin_server_ts (preferred) or
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adding an as_ts which we expect clients to honour)
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* Ability to delete aliases (including from the directory) as well as create them.
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