Minor clarifications to the "end-to-end encryption" module (#1863)
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2 changed files with 6 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -1530,9 +1530,11 @@ claiming to have sent messages which they didn't. `sender` must
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correspond to the user who sent the event, `recipient` to the local
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user, and `recipient_keys` to the local ed25519 key.
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Clients must confirm that the `sender_key` and the `ed25519` field value
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under the `keys` property match the keys returned by [`/keys/query`](/client-server-api/#post_matrixclientv3keysquery) for
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the given user, and must also verify the signature of the keys from the
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Clients must confirm that the `sender_key` property in the cleartext
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`m.room.encrypted` event body, and the `keys.ed25519` property in the
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decrypted plaintext, match the keys returned by
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[`/keys/query`](#post_matrixclientv3keysquery) for
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the given user. Clients must also verify the signature of the keys from the
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`/keys/query` response. Without this check, a client cannot be sure that
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the sender device owns the private part of the ed25519 key it claims to
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have in the Olm payload. This is crucial when the ed25519 key corresponds
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