Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Denis Kasak <dkasak@termina.org.uk>
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3 changed files with 20 additions and 13 deletions
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@ -996,16 +996,23 @@ If a user's client sees that any other user has changed their master
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key, that client must notify the user about the change before allowing
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communication between the users to continue.
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Since device IDs and cross-signing keys occupy the same namespace, clients must
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ensure that they use the correct keys when verifying. While servers must not
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allow devices to have the same IDs as cross-signing keys, a malicious server
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could construct such a situation, so clients must not rely on the server being
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well-behaved and should take precautions against this. For example, clients
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should refer to keys using the public keys rather than only by the device
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ID. Clients should also fix the keys that are being verified, and ensure that
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they do not change in the course of verification. Clients may also display a
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warning and refuse to verify a user when it detects that the user has a device
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with the same ID as a cross-signing key.
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Since device key IDs (`ed25519:DEVICE_ID`) and cross-signing key IDs
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(`ed25519:PUBLIC_KEY`) occupy the same namespace, clients must ensure that they
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use the correct keys when verifying.
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While servers MUST not allow devices to have the same IDs as cross-signing
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keys, a malicious server could construct such a situation, so clients must not
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rely on the server being well-behaved and should take the following precautions
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against this.
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1. Clients MUST refer to keys by their public keys during the verification
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process, rather than only by the key ID.
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2. Clients MUST fix the keys that are being verified at the beginning of the
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verification process, and ensure that they do not change in the course of
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verification.
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3. Clients SHOULD also display a warning and MAY refuse to verify a user when
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it detects that the user has a device with the same ID as a cross-signing
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key.
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A user's user-signing and self-signing keys are intended to be easily
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replaceable if they are compromised by re-issuing a new key signed by
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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ properties:
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description: |-
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A random string uniquely identifying (with respect to the requester
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and the target) the target for a secret. If the secret is requested
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from multiple devices at the same time, the same ID may be used for
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from multiple devices at the same time, the same ID MAY be used for
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every target. The same ID is also used in order to cancel a previous
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request.
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required:
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@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ description: |-
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The `request_id` must match the ID previously given in an `m.secret.request`
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event. The recipient must ensure that this event comes from a device that the
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`m.secret.request` event was originally sent to, and that the device is
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trusted. This should be done by checking the sender key of the Olm session that
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the event was sent over.
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a trusted device owned by the recipient. This should be done by checking the
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sender key of the Olm session that the event was sent over.
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properties:
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content:
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properties:
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