more clarifications
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@ -1013,6 +1013,10 @@ against this.
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3. Clients SHOULD also display a warning and MAY refuse to verify a user when
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it detects that the user has a device with the same ID as a cross-signing
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key.
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4. If a client does not detect when a device has the same ID as a cross-signing
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key, it MUST check key IDs being verified in a consistent order: it must
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check if the key ID matches a cross-signing key first, and if not, treat it
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as a device ID.
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A user's user-signing and self-signing keys are intended to be easily
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replaceable if they are compromised by re-issuing a new key signed by
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@ -1615,8 +1619,8 @@ that they can decrypt future messages encrypted using this session. An
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messages.
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When a client receives a Megolm session, the client MUST ensure that the
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session was received via a channel that ensures authenticity of the messages.
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Practically speaking, this means that Megolm sessions must be received via Olm.
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session was received via an Olm channel, in order to ensure the authenticity of
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the messages.
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When a client is updating a Megolm session in its store, the client MUST ensure:
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